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has been held in New York in

Palmer 115 N.Y.

T HE

I N

RER,

MURDE

the oase of Riggs v.

that a murderer can not take proper-

z$e
While in Nebraska in

case of

Shellenberger v. Ransom 25 Law Reports Annotated 564, it
has been held that a murderer can take property by descent.
In discussing these two cases it will be readily
seen that the statutes in the two states are to be
searched in

order to determine: First:-

Whether the legis

latures have spoken on the particular point
Second:- if
accurate,

in

question.

they have spoken, is their larj4ige clear,

and unambiguous;

or is

it

vague,

inaccurate,
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and ambiguous.

In examining the statutes we find that

there has been no legislation which prohibits a murderer
from taking under a will or by descent;

but we do find

that the legislature in each state has provided a way for
Property to be inherited,

and a way that a will shall

take effect, pass the property thereunder, and the manner
in which it

shall be revoked.

The Nebraska courts have

held that their statute of descents is

clear,

accurate,

and unambiguous; so have the New York courts held the
same as regards their statute, which provides how a will
shall be revoked.

This is

the particular part of the

statute under discussion in the Riggs v. Palmer case
Supra.

In discussing these cases the principals of law involved are the same in each.
save time for my readers,

So in order that I may

and unavoidable repetition,

I

shall confine my discussion to the New York case.
In

that case,

will of Francis B.

the action was brought to have the
Palmer,

so far as it

queathes property to Elmer E.
nulled.
of August,

Palmer,

devises and becancelled and an-

The facts are as follows: On the thirteenth day
1880,

Francis B.

Palmer made his last will and
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testament,

in which he gave small legacies to his two

daughters Mrs.
this action,
grandson,

Riggs and Mrs.

Preston, the plaintiffs in

and the remainder of' his estate to his

the defendant,

Elmer E.

Palmer,

subject to the

support of Mrs. Palmer, in case Elmer should survive him
and die under age, unmarried and without issue.
testator,

at the date of his will,

owned a farm and con-

siderable personal property; he was a widower,
after, in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs.
with whom,

The

and thereBreese,

before his marriage he entered into an ante-

nuptial contract,

in which it

was agreed,

that in lieu of

dower and all other claims upon his property,

in case she

survived him, she should have her support from his farm
during her life, and such support was expressly charged
upon the farm.

At the date of the will,

ly to the death of' the testator,
a member of the family,
years old.

and subsequent-

Elmer lived with him as

and at his death was sixteen

He knew of the provisions made in his favor

in the will, and that lhe might prevent his grandfather
from revoking such provisions,
some intention to do,

and to obtain the speedy enjoyment

of possession of the property,
by poisoning him.

which he had manifested

he willfully mulrdered him

lie now claims the property,

and the
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sole question is,

can he have it?

After a long and careful study,

I have come to the

conclusion that, under the particular circumstances surElmer E. Palmer should have been all-

rounding the case,

owed to take the property under the will,
Francis B. Palmer,

grandfather,
to probate,
tor.

as made by his

which will was admitted

and which had not been revoked by the testa-

I am sustained in my conclusion by the following

cases, viz: Shellenberger v. Ransom, Supra; Owens v.
Owens 100 N.C.

240; Deem v. Milliken,

and 6 Ohio C. Ct.

Rep.

156

357; also. by the following judges

who passed opinions in the Riggs'case.
three judges of the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals.

27 Ohio L. J.

The referee, the

and two judges of the

So that among the eleven judges pass-

ing an opinion, six held with and five against me.

In

the Court of Appeals Gray J. wrote the dissenting opinion
with which Danforth J. concurred.
Judge Danforth at the time this case was decided was
about to leave the bench,
.judge then sitting,

and was therefore the oldest

consequently had more experience,

and

his dissenting opinion was regarded by his associates at
that time,

as a hard blow to their practically new prece-

dent established by their negative decision of this case.
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Judge Danforth saw far into khe future,

and foretold

that such statutory construction was being carried too
far for the good and welfare of the

whole legal profes-

sion, as well as for the private citizen.
Stare Decisis would either have to fail

He saw that

or else the de-

cision of his five associates could not stand.

He saw

in this advancing age of civilization that the rigid
rules laid down by kings and cormon law judge$,could not
be followed accurately and with the same results as of
old.

One text writer in

speaking of Judge$ Danforth's

opinion on this case said:- "It
old,

is

strange how such an

reliable and learr~ed judge could make such a bad

mistake as to give reward for murder."
recognized the great judge's ability,

That text writer
but did not go deep

enough into the case to determine the reasons for his
conclusion.

And,

I think,

if

Judge Danforth's five as-

sociates had studied the various rules for statutory construction more carefully,

and deliberated longer upon the

danger their negative decision would cause, they, too,
would have reached the same conclusion as did their senior brother,

and would have seen that anyv other decision

than that would be clearly beyord their ,1udicial
ity.

author-

V
statutory construction#.

The one point in this case is
Can the statute be construed in
majority judges in

this case,

as the legislature made it?

the marner adopted by the

or must the statute stand
Turning to page 2,548 of

the eighth edition of the Revised Statutes of New York,
we find this statute.

No will in writing except in the

cases hereinafter mentioned, nor any part thereof, shall
be revoked,
in

writing,

or altered,

otherwise than by some other will

or some other writing of the testator,

ing such revocation or alteration,

declar-

and executed with the

same formalities with which the will itself

was required

by law to be executed, or unless such will be burnt, torn
cancelled,

obliterated or destroyed,

for the purpose of revoking the same,

with the intent and
by the testator

himself, or by another person in hid presence,
by his
direction and consent; and when so done by another person the direction and consent of the testator,

the .fact

of such injury or destruction shall be proved by at least
two witnesses.
It

will be readily seen that the statute is

a remed-

ial statute as to personal property and should be l1berally construed,

but as to real property it

is

in deroga-

gation of the common law and should be construed strictly

8

It

is

enough for our purpose to say that a reme:diLl stat-

ute is one that remedies the common law, while a derogaone th

tory statute is

at partly repeals the common law,

or gives a law that was not allowed by the common law.
As the will in

this-case carried both real and personal

property we will allow that the statute is
it

and by givii
will allow,

only remedial,

as liberal a c.nstruction as the law

d4termine whether or not such a construction
as will warrant the f'inal decision in

can be given it
this case.

Judge Earl in his opinion seems to think bhat by
liberal construction is
tation and ar

meant both a rational Interpre-

equitable construction.

that the statute before him Is
its

He acknowledges

plain and unambiguovs in

term; yet he uses so called rational interpretation.

He says that,
thing which is
statute is

it

is

a familiar canon of construction that

within the int4ion

of' the makers of a

as much within the statute as if it

In the Jetteratc.

were with-",

This is true, but to determine what

the legislators intended we must look to their words 0
interpret them to determine their thoughts.
start

We cannot

out upon some haphazard supposition to determine

what thoughts cour@ d through a mar's mind simply because

9

we suppose he would think as ourselves under like case
We must first have some signs he has

and circimstance.
left

our

or given us as a foundation upon which to start

gray matter in

search of his intent.

A rational inter-

pretation is not applicable in this case.

-ages 406 and 407 gives us the follow-

his Institutes at

"A promise or a contract, or a will

ing information.

gives us a right to whatever the promisor,
or the testator design to make ours.
or intention if

Rutherforth in

it

is

the contractor

But this design

considered merely as an act of his

So

mind, can not be known to any one besides himself.

when we speak of his design or intention as the measure
of our claim we must necessarily be understood to mean
the design or intention which he has made known or expressed by some outward mark; because a design or 4n intention which does not appear,

can have no more effect,

or can no more produce a claim, than a design or inten.tion which does not exist.
In

like manner the obligations that are produced by

the civil laws of our country,
of' the legislator,
act of the mind,

arise from the intention

not merely as this intention is

but as it

some outward sign or mark,

is

an

declared or expressed by

which makes it

known to us.
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For the intention of the legislator,
himself,

produces no effect

,

which he keeps to

and is of' no more account

than if he had no such intention.

When we hve no

knowledge we can be under no obligation.

We can not

therefore be obliged to complyo with his will, when we do
and we can no other-

not know for sure what his will is,
wise know what his will is

than by means of' some outward

sign or mark by which this will is

expressed or declared

either in plain or ambiguous terms.

If

his will is

ex-

pressed in plain words then those words are his will or
intent ar

interpretation isArequired.

But if' this will

is expressed In ambiguous terms only so much the harder
is it to determine his will or intent.
the latter case that interpretation is

It is only in
allowed or required
It

to find his meaning, will, or intent.

is

nLecessary

in most all cases to go outside of' the legislator's ambiguous words to determine his intent,
ether signs or marks than his words,

ahd to use some

to find our- his in-

%.nt."
Judge Earl says: "The writ~es of' law do not always
express their intention perf'ectly, but either exceed it
or f'all short of' it,

so that jU~des are to collect it

f'rom rational or probable conjectures and this is

called
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rational interpretation."

The learned judge does not

give his readers the exact definition of rational interpretatin,,
that it

but constructs it from parts of Rutherford so
misleads their minds and just fits

the case.

Rutherford says:

"There are three kinds of

interpretation to wit: the literal,
mixed.

his side of

the ratior4,and the

Where the speaker's or writer's words do not

express his intention perfectly,

but either exceed it

or

fall short of it, so that we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, this is rational interpretation."

But the words in this statute do ex-

press the writer's intention perfectly,

so that thete is

no chance for ary kind of interpretation.
Taking up next the equitable interpretation of statutes or rather equitable construction,

nearly all

text

writers agree that such a c-)nstruction admits within the
operation a class of cases which are neither expressly
named or excluded, but which, from their analogy to the
cases which are named,

are clearly and Justly within the

spirit and general meaning of the Taw.
ute under consideration it

is

But in this stat

-

provided that a wilt shall

not be revoked otherwise than there expressly stated.

S

0
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it

would seem that this construction is

in

this

by its

case, becalse the statute

not applicable
terms excludes

any other case than those there mentioned.
It

is not at all

uncertain but what the legislators

summoned a similar case before their minds at the time
this statute was enacted,

and concluded that as long as

the pumishment had been meted out by them for all rmurderers,

that would be sufficiettt,

and that those persons

claiming through the devisee or legatee murderer should
n~t be deprived of their share in the property disposed
How do the courts know whether the tes-

of by the will.

tator wanted the plaintiffs in

this action to have th-p-

property or tihe persons taking through the murderer?
What right have they to step in

and revoke a will for the

testator and make a new one for him,
injustice is done?

simply because an

Are they not going too far, and tak-

ing upon themselves the power to make laws?
well said that,

the legislature is

It has been

always at hand.

not refer these cases to them when there is

Why

no way of

determining their intent?
The equitable construction of a statute,

as ancient-

ly understood,

was meant a judicial interpretation of a

statute which,

presupposing a legislature to have intend-
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ed what is
intent,

right and just,

pursues and effectuiates that

even though the words of' the statute were plain

and unambiguous.

In

construction of old statutes

it

has been understood as extending to general cases the
application ojo an enactment which literally
to a special ease.

This construction it

was limited
tolerated now,

would he resorted to with great caution ( per Polluck in
Miller v. Salmons 7 Ex. 475).

The reasons for its being

given to ancient statutes were: Firstly,

In

consequence

of the conciseness with which they were drawn.
v.

Burnell 6 Bing.

N.C.

561.

Secondly,

Gwynee

Because the

language was used with no great precision in early times,
and that acts were framed in harmony with the lax methods of interpretation contemporaneously present.
Lord Ellenborough in Wilson v.

Per

Kumbley 7 East 134.

Thirdly, It has been accounted for by the fact that in
those times the dividing line between the legislature and
judicial f'unctions was feebly drawn,

and the imprtance of

the separation imperfectly understood.

of Statutes 311.

Fourth~ly,

That the

Sedgwick int.

jurisdiction of

common law and equity was committed to the same courts,
and th~at,

by blending law and equity together,

great lat-
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itude was given to the judges in matters of propriety to
modify the laws in order to meet the purposes of' ustice
(Dwarris on Stat. Cons. 699.)

in particular cases.
Fifthly,

The ancient practice of having the statutes

drawn by the judges from the petitions and the answers
of the King.

(Coke's Littleton 272a).

The jildges

would naturally be disposed to construe the language in
which they framed the statute as their own,

and therefore

with freedom and indulgence.
It

can hardly he said that any of these reasons can

be taken at this time as authority for equitable construction by our courts.

Yet Judge Earl quotes Coke and

Blackstone as freely as though this case was being tried
away back in

the tirae of those learned jurists.

It will

be almost impossible to refer in this paper to all of
the authorities on this particular branch of statutory
construction, but in order to convince my readers that
the decision of this case in the Court of' Appeals was
wrong, I have thought it best to collect some of the most
important of' these authorities,
in England,

which will,

I think,

both in this country and
show that in modern

times this kind of' construction has practically f'allen
into disuse.
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"This principal of equitable construction has fallen into discredit, and become looked upon with distrust,
and courts of chancery endeavor to adhere to the much
Vore logical rule that, equity follows the law.

Yet

there are some exceptions which have been established."
(Sedgwick on Stat. Cons. P. 311).

Aostly

The exceptions appear

in cases that are based upon contract aId the stat o

ute of frauids which has been found to be very loosely
drawn., and impossible to bring all the cases within its
letter.
"A remedial statute must be construed if possible
so as to correct the mischief at which it is aimed.

B

if the language is very explicit there is great danger
in departing from the words used to give an effect to
the law which may be supposed to have been designed by
the legislator."
and C. 182).

(6 B. and C. 475; 10 Peters 524; 3 B.

"The duty of the judge is to adhere to the

legal text, and not to travel out of what expressly or
implie4ly says."

"We can not aid the legislature's de-

fective phrasing of an act; we can not add and exand, and
by construction make up defects which are left out."
(Dwarris P 704).

The language of statuItes,4 but more es-

pecially modern statutes, must neither be extended beyond
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its natural and proper meaning in

to supply defects
0rder

nor strainJto meet the justice of' an individual case."
(7 Queens Bench at P.

185).

"It

is a principal in the

English law that an act of parliauent delivered in clear
and intelligible terms car. not be questioned, or its authority controlled in any court of jstice.

If the

statute be too palpable in its direction to admit of but
one constructkon there is no doubt in the English law,
as to the binding efficacy of" the statute.

The will of

the legislature is the supreme law of the land.:

Al-

though it is undoubtedly true that judges when interpreting the laware to explore the intent of the legislature,
yet it

is

equally true that the construction to be. put

upon an act,

must be such as is

warranted,

not repugnant to the words of' the act.

or at least

Where the object

of the legislature is plaii, and thq words of the act unequivocal, courts ought to adopt such a construction as
will best effectuate the intent of" the law makers; but
they must not, even in order to give effect to what they
may suppose to be the intention of the legislature, put
the provision of a statute a constru ction not supported
by the words, even though the consequences should be to
defeat the objects of' the act."

(Rex v. Stoke Damerel 7

17

B and C. 569).

"Where the legislature has used words of

plain and definite import, it would be dangerous to put
upon them a construction which would amount to holding
that the legislature did not intend to mean what they had
clearly said.

The courts are not to prestune the inten-

tion of the legislature; they are to collect it from the
words of the act."

(6 B and C. 712).

Lord Tenderden in

one case said: "Our decision may perhaps in this particular case operate to defeat the object of the statute,
but it is better to abide by this consequence than to put
upon it a construction not warranted by the words of the
act, in order to carry out what we may suppose to be the
intent of the legislature."
104).

(Rex v. Bolton 8 B. and C.

Equity can not relieve against the express pro-

visions of a statute.

(11 Vesey at P 627; Law Reports

ch. D. P. 297; Wilberforce on statutes at P. 238 and 9;
Potters Dwarris on Statutes at Ps 239 and 44; 7 B. and C.
569. 17 Wendall 304.)

The citations already referred to

are mostly those from English authorities.

I will now

refer br'iefly to American au~thorities.

Mr. Justice Chase in Priestrnant&United States Pt
Dallas 30. said: "By the rules which are laid down in

/
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England for the construction of statutes, and the latitude which has been indulged in their application, the
British judges have assumed a legislative power and in
the pretense of judicial exposition, have in part made a
great portion of the statute law of the kingdom.

Of

these rules of construction, none can be more dangerous,
than that which distinguishes between intent and the words
of th0 legislature which declares that a case not within
the meaning of the statute, according to the opinion of
the judges, should not be embraced within the operation,
although it is clearly within the words; and vice versa
that a case within the meaning, though not within the
words, shall be embraced.

Sitting in an American Court

he should always deem it a duty to conform to the expressions of the legislature, to the letter of the statute,
when free from ambiguity and doubt, without indulgence in
speculationupon the impropriety or hardship of the law."
Senator Verplanck in Stone etal v. The Mayor of New York
25 Wend.

,177
said: "The experience of" late years has

taught the courts the danger of excess in bold interpretation, according to the presumned intent and against the
plain language of acts.

The ablest and g

est

judges
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have borne testimony against the evils of the ancient decisions in this spirit.

it is the duty of judges to in-

terpret ar-d apply the provisions of statute laws,
to supply their real or supposed effects,
out and apply their presumed policy&

arnd not

or to carry

However rigidly

courts might Ato this intention there would often be neces
sity for great latitude of interpretation.

Whatever may

have been the policy or excuse in other countries, or in
older times,

for such bold construction or alteration of

legislative language, with us it is irpostility to the
genius and spirit of our republican institutiorW which
aim at laying open to every citizen, as far as possible,
a knowledge of his duty and his right.
books,

The statute

and the laws of our annual legislation would be-

comeunder such an arbitrary system of determination,
not merely a sealed book to the private citizen,

or the

inferior magistrate, but would lead into constant error
when the language of the legislative,

was apparently the

most simple, direct, intelligible, and technical,-it
could and would be construed in

a precisely con~trary

sense as to its

The rule that restr'icted

legal effect.

courts to the interpretation of the statute,
ed them from altering or amen~ding it

and Anhibit-

on any assued equi-

20

or supposed legislative policy,

ty,

was the rule of the

well regulated republican liberty as well as that of
justice and reason,"
clear every

the ineaning of the iegislature is

"If

(Oates V.

technical rule of construction must yield."
National Bank 100 U. S.
ers 627.)

Leeland 2 Pet-

239; Wilkinson v.

Where the legislature has made no exception

the courts of justice can make none as this would be legislating.

Bank v. Dalton 9 Howard 522.*

McIver v. Rag-

Troup v. Smith 20 John. 33.

an 2 Wheaton 29.

Hamelton

The following cases warrant the

v. Smith 3 Murphy 115.

pertinent conclusion that,

when the legislature,

not

transcending the limits of its power, speaks in clear

Hadden v. Barney 72

dicial tribunals to remain silent.
U.

S.

107.

Hyatt v.

Taylor 42 N. Y. 258 In

25 Vt. 261.

State v. Liedtke 9. Neb.

Weed 18 Minn.

272.

204.

Brmer v.

Woodburg & Co.

Briggs 37 Ohio St.

Mahof±'ay 10 Ohio St.

Woodhull 25 Mich.
fay is

99.

becomes the ju-

It

language upon a question of policy.

204.

v.

464.

Re Powers
Jewell v.

Berry 10 Ohio. St.

478.

Flint and F.

Kent et al v.
Plan~k Co.

The case of' Kent et al v.

a very strong case,

v.
Mahof-

even stronger than the one

under discussion and upon the same statute.

There was a

21

case in

Ontario recently decided but its

decision really

has no bearing upon this Riggs&case either one way or
the other.

(McKinnon

v.

Lundy 21 Ontario Appeals 560).

Judge Earl says: "Our

law makers were fauiliar with

the civil law,

and they did not deem it

to incorporate

into our stqtute its

subject.

That so far as I

the common law prevails has

provisions upon this

can f ind,
it

wise or important

in

no country where

been deemed important to

enact a law to provide for such a case.A

Had the judge's

attention been called to the revised statutes of Mississippi he would have found that the legislature of" that
state deemed it
too,

important to enact such a law,

and that

before any litigation had arisen on the subject.

Section 4,502 of the Annotated Code of' Miss.

provides,

If

any person shall willfully cause or procure the death

qr

another in any manner, he shall not take the property,

or any part thereof' real or personal of" such other, under
any will,

testament,

or codicil;

any devise to such per-

son shall be void, and as to the property so devised the
4ce~iant shall be deemed to have died intestate,
Section 1554 is

etc.

a like provision for property taken by

22

descent.

This part of the judge's argument must fall

through, because in his own country which follows the
COMo

law in

the absence of' statute,

has legislated upon the subject.
Smart 7 Term Rep.

Butler J. in Jones V.

53 said: We are bound to take the act

of Parliamient as they made it,

a casus omissus can in no

ways be supplied by a court of law,

for that would be to

See also per Bronson J.

make the law."
It

one of the states

will make no difference if

it

17 Wendall 304.

appears that the omiso-

sion on the part of the legislature was a mere oversight,
and that without doubt the act would have been drawn
otherwise had the attention of the legislature been
called to the oversight at the time the act wqs under
discussion.

Lane v.

Leadgate L.R.

Bennet 7.

5,Queens B.

M. W. 70.

N.E. R'y v.

161.

The learned judge also relies upon the case of the
N.

Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong 117 U. S. 591.

The

statement referred to given by Mr. Justice Field, is but
a mere dictum,

as no representative of' Hunter was a party

to the action.

So that case can not be taken as author-

ity.

in

Landon J.

referring to that case said: "That

was a case of contract;

it

certainly could not be held

that the company had promised to pay the insurance money

23

to the murderer of the person whose life is insured.
Such a contract would be so umreasonable and against
public policy that the courts could well hold that the
minds of the contracting party had never met upon such a
proposition, and if they had the contract would be void."
But a will is

not a contract.

The law has pronounced

4

its sentence upon this murderer, Elmer E. Palmer, and
that sentence does hot embrace incapacity to take under
the will.A

As the legislature had not imposed such a

sentence the court surely had no legal authority to do
so.

Thus it seems that the law of this country must

follow the decisions reached in Nebraska,
and Ohio.

South Carolina,

